Paul Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Company, Inc. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Paul Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine
Company, Inc. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Hasenyager; Martin W. Custen; Marguardt, Hasenyager & Custen; Attorneys for Appellant.
Douglas B. Thomas; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking, No. 910046.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3406
( < - f ^ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ARGUELLO, 
c 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING 
MACHINE COMPANY, INC. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 910046 
Priority Classification: 16 
BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge. 
Douglas B. Thomas 
VANCOTT, BAGGLSY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Attorney for Appellee 
2404 Washington Blvd., #900 
Ogden, UT 84401 
James R. Hasenyager 
and Martin W. Custen 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2661 Washington Blvd., #202 
Ogden, UT 84401 
fr*19 I 8 
i iL. 
|Wnr» 
APR 1 0 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ARGUELLO, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING 
MACHINE COMPANY, INC. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 910046 
Priority Classification: 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge. 
Douglas B. Thomas 
VANCOTT, BAGGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Attorney for Appellee 
2404 Washington Blvd., #900 
Ogden, UT 84401 
James R. Hasenyager 
and Martin W. Custen 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER St CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2661 Washington Blvd., #202 
Ogden, UT 84401 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES • • • i± 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT. . 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . 2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 5 
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings. . 5 
Disposition in Lower Court 5 
Statement of the Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 7 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT MINIMAL 
CONTACTS WITH UTAH TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT 7 
A. UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE APPLIES . . . 7 
B. THERE WERE SUFFICIENT MINIMAL 
CONTACTS TO ENABLE UTAH TO ASSERT 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT. . . 8 
CONCLUSION 14 
ADDENDUM 
A. Ruling on Motion to Dismiss 
B. Order of Dismissal 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons, 148 U.A.R. 3 (Utah Sup. 
Ct. 11/15/90) 2,8,11 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 
102 (1987) 11 
Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988) 8,13 
, md.
 c 
Burt Drilling Company, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P. 2d 
244 (Utah 1980) 11 
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961) 10 
Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, 
618 P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980) 9 
Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659 
(Utah 1989) 8,9,11,12 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching, Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106 
(Utah 1985) 13 
World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286 (1980) 10,11 
Law Journal Articles Cited 
Note, 'Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corporation: The 
"Mauling" of Personal Jurisdiction Theory1, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 479 11 
Statutes Cited 
Section 78-27-22, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. . . 14 
Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. . . 8 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ARGUELLO, ] 
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INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING 
MACHINE COMPANY, INC. ] 
Defendant and Appellee. 
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I Priority Classification: 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Pursuant to Rule 44, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this case was transferred to the Utah Supreme 
Court on January 24, 1991, by Order of Gregory K. Orme, 
Judge of the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3)(j ), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the lower court err in ruling that Appellee IWMC 
had insufficient minimum contacts with Utah to sustain 
personal jurisdiction over it under Section 78-27-24, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended? The standard of review, this 
being a pretrial jurisdictional decision based on 
documentary evidence, is a de novo review of the judge's 
decision for correctness* Anderson v. American Society of 
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 148 U.A.R. 3 (Utah Sup. 
Ct. 11/15/90). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Section 78-27-22, Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
It is declared, as a matter of 
legislative determination, that the 
public interest demands the state provide 
its citizens with an effective means of 
redress against nonresident persons, who, 
through certain significant minimal 
contacts with this state, incur 
obligations to citizens entitled to the 
state's protection. This legislative 
action is deemed necessary because of 
technological progress which has 
substantially increased the flow of 
commerce between the several states 
resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and persons 
of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to 
ensure maximum protection to citizens of 
this state, should be applied so as to 
assert jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants to the fullest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the 
following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state 
as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business 
within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services 
of goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within 
this state whether tortious or by breach 
of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use or possession 
of any real estate situated in this 
state; 
(5) contracting to insure any 
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person, property, or risk located within 
this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of 
divorce, separate maintenance, or child 
support, having resided, in the marital 
relationship, within this state 
notwithstanding subsequent departure from 
the state; or the commission in this 
state of the act giving rise to the 
claim, so long as that act is not a mere 
omission, failure to act, or occurrence 
over which the defendant had no control; 
or 
(7) the commission of sexual 
intercourse within this state which gives 
rise to a paternity suit under Chapter 
45a, Title 78, to determine paternity for 
the purpose of establishing 
responsibility for child support. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an Order of the lower court 
dismissing Appellant Arguello's Complaint for lack of 
sufficient minimal contacts necessary for an assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over Appellee Industrial Woodworking 
Machine Company, Inc. (hereinafter "IWMC"). 
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings 
IWMCfs Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was granted by 
Judge Roth. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
Judge Roth granted IWMCfs Motion to Dismiss and 
entered an Order of Dismissal on or about November 2, 1990. 
Statement of the Facts 
IWMC is located in Garland, Texas (Complaint, R at 
1). It manufactured a particular industrial jointing 
machine, Model 3470, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-4-10771, in Texas 
(Complaint, R at 1; Affidavit of Gail Y. Cromeens, paragraph 
number 10, R at 18-19) (hereinafter "the jointing machine"). 
This jointing machine was sold originally in 1971 to 
Pickering Lumber Company in Standard, California (Cromeens 
Affidavit, paragraph number 10, R at 18-19). 
By 1982, the jointing machine was in the State of 
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Utah (Cromeens Affidavit, paragraph number 10, R at 18-19). 
In July of 1982, a company known as Weathershield, Inc., of 
Logan, Utah, contacted IWMC and requested it to send a 
service representative to Utah to examine certain machinery 
in Weathershield's possession, including the very same 
jointing machine, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-4-10771 (Cromeens 
Affidavit, paragraph number 10, R at 18-19). IWMC in fact 
sent a service representative to Utah to inspect this 
particular jointing machine for wood popping out, (Cromeens 
Affidavit, paragraph number 10, R at 18-19). 
Mr. Arguello was employed by Weathershield, Inc., 
of Logan, Utah, on July 16, 1987, when he was injured by 
what he alleged in his Complaint to be the direct result of 
unreasonably dangerous conditions of the jointing machine 
(Complaint, paragraphs number 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 
and 13, R at 1-3). The specific basis of the machine's 
defects alleged by Mr. Arguello were failure to utilize 
guards and failure to warn users adequately (Complaint, 
paragraph number 6, R at 2). The specific factual cause of 
injury alleged was wood popping out. 
Mr. Arguello acknowledges that IWMC, during the 
last nine years, has had yearly sales in Utah averaging 
$13,15 3.00, which is only 0.3 percent of its total sales 
volume (Cromeens Affidavit, paragraph number 3, R at 17). 
Additionally, during the past nine years, the products sold 
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to Utah consist mostly of parts, rather than equipment or 
machinery, as a result of Utah customer contacts (Cromeens 
Affidavit, paragraph number 4, R at 17). The jointing 
machine which injured Mr. Arguello cost $85,000.00 in 1971 
(Cromeens Affidavit, Exhibit A, R at 21-23). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in ruling there were not 
sufficient minimal contacts for an assertion of personal 
jurisdiction. When a company which manufactures an 
$85,000.00 jointing machine and sells one in California, is 
put on notice that its machine is in Utah, and additionally 
sends a service representative to inspect the machine in 
Utah, where it does some other business, and the machine 
subsequently injures a user in Utah, there are sufficient 
minimal contacts. The company should be able to anticipate 
being sued in Utah over this particular jointing machine, 
and traditional notions of fair play and justice are not 
offended by asserting jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IWMC 
DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT MINIMAL CONTACTS 
WITH UTAH TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER IT. 
A. UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE APPLIES. 
Any inquiry into personal jurisdiction involves a 
two-fold approach, the first prong of which involves a 
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determination of whether Utah's long-arm statute provides 
for the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular non-
resident defendant. Anderson v. American Society of Plastic 
and Reconstructive Surgeons, 148 U.A.R. 3 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
11/15/90); Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659 
(Utah 1989); Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988). 
Utahfs long-arm statute, Section 78-27-24, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended, provides for personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant as follows: 
Any person, notwithstanding 
Section 16-10-102, whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who in 
person or through an agent does any of 
the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state 
as to any claim arising from: 
(3) the causing of any injury 
within this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty... 
Mr. Arguello has alleged that IWMCfs unreasonably 
dangerous jointing machine caused him injury in Utah, both 
tortious (Complaint, Second Cause of Action, R at 2-3), and 
by virtue of a product liability claim, which is in the 
nature of a breach of warranty (Complaint, First Cause of 
Action, R at 1-2). Clearly, IWMC's acts, as alleged in the 
Complaint, fall within this statutory category. 
B. THERE WERE SUFFICIENT MINIMAL 
CONTACTS TO ENABLE UTAH TO ASSERT 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER IWMC. 
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The fact that Utah's long-arm statute provides a 
basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over IWMC is 
the first prong of the two-fold approach mentioned above. 
The second prong involves analyzing whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over IWMC comports with basic due 
process. Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, at 
662. This in turn involves a two-step process: (1) Has IWMC 
purposely established minimum contacts with Utah; and (2) If 
it has, these contacts should be considered in light of 
other factors to determine whether the assertion of 
jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial 
justice. Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, at 794 (Utah 
1988); Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, 618 
P.2d 1004, at 1008 (Utah 1980). 
As to number 1, it is submitted that IWMC has 
purposely established minimum contacts with Utah. In the 
modern world, it is naive to argue that an $85,000.00 piece 
of equipment sold by a Texas company to a California 
company, will not be resold ever. Whether the Texas company 
cares or does not care about its resale, the very 
marketability of a product depends partly upon its resale 
value. And, it would clearly have been foreseeable that the 
product would be resold for placement in a nearby state such 
as Utah. 
This is a stream-of-commerce theory, but, as noted 
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by Justice White in the majority opinion in World Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), 
foreseeability alone will not satisfy the minimum contacts 
requirement: 
...the foreseeability that is critical to 
due process analysis is not the mere 
likelihood that a product will find its 
way into the forum state. Rather, it is 
that the defendantf s conduct and 
connection with the forum state are such 
that he should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into courto there. 444 U.S. 
286, at 297. 
Under the World Wide Volkswagen minimum contacts 
rule, such contacts are established by showing that the sale 
of the product arises from the efforts of the manufacturer 
to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product 
in other states [See also, Gray v. American Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 
(1961), in which, under a stream of commerce theory, the 
Illinois Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction over a 
Pennsylvania valve manufacturer that sold a defective valve 
to an Ohio corporation for use in a water heater, where the 
Pennsylvania manufacturer's only contact with Illinois was 
that its product ultimately caused injury there.] It is 
submitted that such a showing has been made in the present 
case. 
Utah has, however, required purposeful contact 
beyond the mere foreseeability of a product's reaching Utah 
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in an unreasonably dangerous condition, in order to satisfy 
the minimum contacts requirement. See, e.g., Burt Drilling 
Company, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (1980). And 
Appellant acknowledges that the Utah Supreme Court's most 
recent decision on the minimum contacts rule, Parry v. Ernst 
Home Center, supra, adopted the rule of the plurality 
opinion of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102 (1987), rather than the majority opinion in World 
Wide Volkswagen, supra. 
The Parry decision has been questioned and 
criticized for this approach, see Note, 'Parry v. Ernst Home 
Center Corporation: The "Mauling" of Personal Jurisdiction 
Theory1, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 479; Anderson v. American Society 
of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 148 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 
Sup. Ct. 11/15/90) (recognizing, at footnote number 1, the 
Utah Law Review Note). For the reasons so much more 
eloquently expressed in the Utah Law Review Note, Appellant 
urges this Court to utilize the World Wide Volkswagen 
analysis. 
However, it is submitted that even under the 
minimum contacts requirement of Parry v. Ernst Home Center 
Corp., supra, Mr. Arguello established the requisite minimum 
contacts. In Parry, the Utah Supreme Court, adopting the 
Asahi plurality rule, held that purposeful conduct in 
addition to simply placing a product in the stream of 
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commerce is required. The purposeful conduct with Utah in 
which IWMC engaged was the sending of its service 
representative to Utah in 1982 to inspect the very jointing 
machine that injured Mr. Arguello. Not only did IWMC spend 
money to send a salaried employee from Texas to Utah, but 
the employee was sent to deal with the very same problem 
that, it is alleged, caused Mr. Arguello's injury, to-wit: 
wood popping out of the jointing machine (Cromeens 
Affidavit, paragraph number 10, R at 18-19. 
Certainly from the time of that visit on, IWMC was 
on notice that a very expensive piece of its equipment, 
which at the time of its original sale to a California 
company would foreseeably end up in Utah, was in fact in 
Utah. IWMC did not decline to send a service representative 
to Utah in 1982. It did not notify Mr. Arguello1s employer 
that it did not or would not service the machine because of 
increased risk of litigation or not being insured. In fact, 
IWMC was doing other business in Utah at the time, see 
Cromeens Affidavit, paragraph number 3, R at 17, and 
undoubtedly had insurance. Thus, it is submitted that IWMC 
had sufficient minimal contacts with Utah, even under the 
rule of Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp. , supra, and that 
Judge Roth erred when he found to the contrary. 
Although Judge Roth did not reach this issue, as 
mentioned above, once sufficient minimal contacts are found, 
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they must be considered along with other factors to 
determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction comports 
with fair play and substantial justice. Bradford v. Nacjle, 
763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988). These other factors include: (1) 
the interrelationship of the defendant, the forum and the 
litigation; (2) whether Mr. Arguello's cause of action 
arises out of or has a substantial connection with IWMCfs 
activity in Utah and a balancing of the convenience of the 
parties and the interest of the state in assuming 
jurisdiction; Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); and (3) in appropriate cases, an 
evaluation of the burden on the defendant, Utah's interest 
in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff1s interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate 
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the 
several states in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies. Bradford v. Nagle, supra. 
Applying these criteria, Utah can assert 
jurisdiction over IWMC. Under number (1), there is a 
definite interrelationship among IWMC, Utah and the present 
lawsuit. Under number (2), Mr. Arguello's claim arises out 
of IWMC's placing of the jointing machine in the stream of 
commerce. Certainly IWMC would have to defend the same 
claim if it arose in California, so it is more, not less, 
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convenient to defend in a cluser state, particularly a state 
with which IWMC has other contacts. Under number (3), Utah 
has a strong interest in adjudicating the controversy 
because one of its citizens was injured here. See Section 
78-27-22, Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
...the public interest demands 
the state provide its citizens with an 
effective means of redress against 
non-resident persons who ...incur 
obligations to citizens entitled to the 
state's protection. This legislative 
action is deemed necessary because of 
technological progress which has 
substantially increased the flow of 
commerce between the several states 
resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and persons 
of other states. 
CONCLUSION 
IWMC placed an expensive piece of equipment into 
the stream of commerce in 1971, when it was foreseeable that 
the jointing machine would be resold to a Utah company. 
Utah is a state in which IWMC does some business. IWMC then 
established sufficient minimal contacts with Utah by sending 
a service representative here in 1982 to inspect the very 
jointing machine that subsequently injured Mr. Arguello for 
the very problem that caused his injury. Having established 
sufficient minimum contacts, it is fair that IWMC defend 
against Mr. Arguello's claims in Utah. For these reasons, 
the judgment and order of dismissal of the district court 
should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the 
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trial court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2661 Washington Boulevard, #202 
Ogden, UT 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
i3t< 
, I hereby certify that on this day of 
/ vi>M 1991, I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, 
to Mr. Douglas B. Thomas, VAN COTT, BAGGLEY, CORNWALL & 





ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT A 
./] RECEIVED SEP 1 8 198Q 
_
 ; ^ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 900900492 
Having reviewed the memoranda on file pertaining to 
defendant's motion to dismiss, I find and rule as follows: 
For purposes of this ruling, I find the facts to be as 
represented in the affidavit of Gail Y. Cromeens attached to 
defendant's memorandum and note that plaintiff has supplied no 
affidavits or exhibits countering those facts. 
Relevant facts include the fact that the machine in 
question was sold by defendant for use in California in 1971. 
There is no indication how the machine found its way to Utah. 
The machine had been modified since it left defendant's 
possession. One of defendant's service representatives examined 
the machine in Utah in 1982 and recommended that the modifica-
tions be reversed or otherwise corrected. The owners of the 
machine indicated that they would correct the problem. There is 
no evidence that defendant or defendant's representative was 
PAUL ARGUELLO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 1 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACHINE, 
Defendant. T 
Page 2 
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss 
Case No. 900900492 
asked to correct the problem. Plaintiff was injured using the 
machine in 1987. During the last nine years, defendants sales 
in Utah consist of 0.3% of the company's total sales volume. As 
described in defendant's affidavit, defendant has almost no 
contact with the State of Utah and most sales involve Utah 
customers contacting defendant to order parts. 
Having reviewed the various cases submitted as authority 
for the positions of each party, I find the most compelling 
decision to be found in Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. 
Philadelphia Resins, 766 F.2d 440 (10th Circuit 1985). This 
case is very close to the instant case on the facts, and while I 
do not agree with defendant that the case is binding authority 
as it applies to this court, I find it to be very persuasive and 
not inconsistent with Utah cases. 
I find that defendant did not have the necessary contacts 
with Utah to allow Utah courts to acquire personal jurisdiction 
over defendant and therefore defendant's motion to dismiss is 
granted. 
Defendant is to prepare an order consistent with this 
decision for my signature. 
DATED this / f day of September, 1990. 
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Ruling on Motion to Dismiss 
Case No. 900900492 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the H d aY o f September, 
1990, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to counsel as follows: 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2661 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Douglas B. Thomas 
VAN COTT, BAGELY, CORNWALL & MC CARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2404 Washington Boulevard, Suite 900 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
L 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No, 1404 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ARGUELLO : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. : 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING : 
MACHINE CO-, INC. 
Defendant and Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No, 900900492PI 
Judge: David E. Roth 
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure plaintiff Paul Arguello hereby gives notice of his 
intent to appeal a ruling of Judge David E- Roth in the 
above-entitled case dismissing plaintiff's complaint for 
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on a 
finding of insufficient contacts by defendant with Utah to 
allow Utah Courts to acquire personal jurisdiction. 
Judge Rothfs order was entered on November 2, 1990. 
This appeal is taken to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this Q*J day of ^/^^rr^LQ^^, 1990. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
OAMES R. HAS 
Attorney for Plaint 
Appellant 
State Surety Company 
Lawyers Surety Corporation 
x. 
Old Republic Insurance Company 
Old Republic Surety Company 
UNDERTAKING OF CORPORATE SURETY Bond No, 1054043 
Second Judicial District Court 
Weber County NO. 900900492 
Paul Arguello 
VS. 
I n d u s t r i a l Woodworking 
Machine Co., Inc . 
P l a i n t i f f 
Defendant 
WHEREAS, the Plaint i ff 
UNDERTAKING 
f~"] On Attachment 
| | On Garnishment 
f~] On Claim and Delivery 
[x] Cost on A p p e a l 
desires to give an undertaking On Cost 
as provided to be given in Rule _6_ 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned Surety, the Old Republic Surety Company 
a Surety Company authorized to act as Surety on bonds and undertakings in the 
State of U t a h does hereby obligate 
itself to the Said Defendant 
under such 
statutory obligations in the sum of Three Hundred and no/100-
.--Do! 1 ars. 





OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
POWER OF ATTORNEY 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS That OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY a Wisconsin stock insurance corporation. 
oes make, constitute and appoint 
C. BRETT NILSSON, STUART P. YOUNG, CLARENCE T.' BRASHER, OF OGDEN, UT 
s true and lawful Attorney(s)-m-Fact with full power and authority for and on behalf of the company as surety, to execute and deliver and affix 
he seal of the company thereto (if a seal is required), bonds, undertakings, recognizances or other written obligations in the nature thereof, 
other than bail bonds bank depositor/ bonds mortgage deficiency bonds mortgage guaranty bonds guarantees of installment paper and note 
juaranty bonds), as follows 
A L L W R I T T E N I N S T R U M E N T S I N AN AMOUNT NOT TO E X C E E D AN A G G R E G A T E OF 
TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS($ 250,000) FOR ANY SINGLE OBLIGATION, 
REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS ISSUED FOR THE OBLIGATION. 
and to bind OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY thereby and all of the acts of said Attorneys-m-Fact pursuant to these presents are ratified 
and confirmed This appointment is made under and by authority of the board of directors at a special meeting held on February 18 1982 
This Power of Attorney is signed and seaied by facsimile under and by the authority of the following resolutions adopted by the board of 
directors of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY on February 18 1982 
RESOLVED that the president any vice-president or assistant vice-president in conjunction with the secretary or any assistant secretary 
may appoint attorneys-in-fact or agents with authority as defined or limited in the instrument evidencing the appointment in each case 
for and on behalf of the compan/ to execute and deliver and affix the seal of the company to bonds undertakings recognizances and 
suretyship obligations of all kinds and said officers may remove any such attorney-in-fact or agent and revoke any power of attorney 
previously granted to such person 
RESOLVED FURTHER trial any bond undertaking recognizance or suretyship obligation shall De valid and binding upon the Company 
(i) when signed by the president any vice-president or assistant vice president and attested and sealed (if a seai be required) by any secretary or assistant 
secretary or 
(H) when signed by the president any vice president or assistant vice president secretary or assistant secretary anc countersigned and sealed (if a seal be 
required) by a duly authorized attomey-m fact or agent or 
(m) when duly executed and sealed (if a seal be required) by one or more attorneys in fact or agents pursuant to and within the limits of the authority evidenced 
by the power ot attorney issued bv }he company to such person oi persons 
RESOLVED FURTHER that the signature of any authorized officer and the seal of the company may be affixed by facsimile to any power of attorney or certification 
thereof authorizing the execution and delivery of any bond, undertaking, recognizance, or other suretyship obligations of tie company and such signature and seal 
when so used shall have the same force and effect as though manually affixed 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY has caused these presents to be signed by its proper officer and its 
corporate seal to be affixed this 9 T % a y o f MAY 19 90 
o SEAL 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
Asst Secretary 
STATE OF WISCONSIN, COUNTY OF WAUKESHA - SS 
President 
On this 9TH day of_ MAY 19 90 , personally came before me DONALD L BOWEN 
and PATRICIA A MORTAG to me known to be the individuals and officers of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY who executed the 
above instrument, and they each acknowledged the execution of the same, and being by me duly sworn did severally depose and say, that 
they are the said officers of the corporation aforesaid, and that the seal affixed to the above instrument is the seal of the corporation, and 
that said corporate seal and their signatures as such officers were duly affixed and subscribed to the said instrument by the authority of 
the board of directors of said corporation 
Notary Pubic 
0 1 / 3 1 /93 
My commission expires 
CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, assistant secretary of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY, a Wisconsin corporation, CERTIFY that the fore-
going and attached power of attorney remains in full force and has not been revoked and furthermore that the Resolutions of the board 
of directors set forth in the Power of Attorney, are now in force. 
0 4 8 - 1 1 3 5 o SEAL : f Signed and sealed at the City of Brookfield, Wl this 3 0 t h day of November 19 90 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ARGUELLO : MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME TO APPEAL 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING : Civil No.900900492PI 
MACHINE CO., INC. 
Defendant 
Pursuant to Rule 4(e) Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure plaintiff Paul Arguello hereby moves to file a 
Notice of Appeal in the above entitled case. A judgment 
was entered on November 2, 1990 and a Notice of Appeal filed 
on November 30, 1990. The Notice of Appeal indicated that 
appeal was being taken to the Utah Court of Appeals where 
the case was docketed on December 7, 1990. The Notice of 
Appeal should have stated that the appeal was being taken to 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
Arguello vs. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co. 
Civil No. 900900492PI 
Page 2 
Plaintiff asks that the Court grant an extension of 10 days 
to refile the Notice of Appeal stating the correct court to 
which the appeal should be taken. 
DATED this day of /C^^^MC^ 1990. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
AMES R. HASENYAGI 
Attorney for Plairnti, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
I hereby certify that on this , £- day of 
December, 1990, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Douglas B. Thomas 
VAN COTT, BAGELY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
2404 Washington Boulevard, Suite 900 
Ogden, UT 84401 
ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT 
RECEIVEDOCT 2 5 Wffl? 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Douglas B. Thomas - #5550 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2404 Washington Boulevard, Suite 900 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ARGUELLO, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
VS. ) 
) Civil No. 900900492 
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING ) 
MACHINE CO., INC., OF ) Judge David E. Roth 
UTAH, ) 
Defendant. ) 
The court, having reviewed defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss and the various memoranda supporting and opposing the 
said motion that had been submitted by the parties, hereby 
makes the following findings, conclusions and orders: 
1. The facts are those as represented in the 
affidavit of Gail Y. Cromeens attached to defendant's 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has 
supplied no affidavits or exhibits countering these facts. 
2. The finger joint machine that allegedly injured 
the plaintiff was sold by defendant for use in California in 
1971. There is no indication how the machine found its way to 
Utah. 
3. The machine had been modified after it left the 
defendant's possession. There is no evidence that defendant or 
defendant's representative was asked to correct the problem. 
The owners of the machine indicated they would correct the 
problem. 
4. Plaintiff's claimed injuries occurred in 1987. 
5. Defendant has almost no contact with the state of 
Utah. During the last nine years, defendant's sales in Utah 
consisted of only 0.3% of the defendant's total sales volume. 
Most of these sales involved Utah customers contacting the 
defendant to order parts rather than machinery or equipment. 
6. The facts of this case are very close to those in 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Philadelphia Resins, 766 
F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 75 U.S. 1082, 106 S. 
Ct. 853 (1986), which the court finds to be very persuasive and 
not inconsistent with Utah cases concerning jurisdiction. 
7. The defendant did not have the necessary contacts 
with Utah to allow Utah courts to acquire personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID E. ROTH, District Judge 
-2-
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF 
TO: Paul Arguello, Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, 
James R. Hasenyager, 2 661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 
202, Ogden, UT 84401: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, 
attorney for defendant, will submit the above and foregoing 
order to the Honorable David E. Roth for his signature, upon 
the expiration of five days from the date of this notice, 
together with three days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah 
rules of Judicial Administration• 
DATED this 7 ^ day of ficfap^ , 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By 
Dougla$ B. The 
Defendant 
2404 Washington Boulevard, 
Suite 900 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Order of Dismissal to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, this .^  2 day of O"^^^"^"^ , 1990, to the 
following: 
Mr. James R. Hasenyager 
Marquardt, Hasenyager & Custn 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202 
Ogden, UT 84401 
